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Abstract
Over the last twenty years, numerous states and the federal government enacted
mandatory minimum reforms, especially for drug offenses. Yet little is known about
how effective these reforms have been at the state-level in lowering drug sentences.
Using quasi-experimental methods and administrative data, this study evaluates
the impact of state-level mandatory minimum reforms on drug sentences and their
concomitant racial-ethnic disparities. We find that state-level mandatory minimum
reforms do not lower drug sentences in general or change racial-ethnic disparities
statistically significantly. These findings suggest that the profound racial-ethnic
bias sparked by state-level mandatory minimums are not fully ameliorated by subsequent state-level reforms.
JEL codes: K14, K42.
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Introduction
As a direct result of stringent criminal justice policies, the United States now has the

highest incarceration rate in the world (Walmsley et al., 2018; Carson, 2018; Tonry, 2013).
“Tough on crime” policies are designed to increase prison admissions and to lengthen
time served behind bars (Pfaff, 2017). Foremost among these policies are mandatory
minimum sentencing laws. Mandatory minimum sentences (or mandatory minimums)
are statutes that require judges to sentence defendants to a specified minimum prison
term for a specific crime. These laws mandate a minimum sentence or prison time for
certain offenses (for example, drug, violent, or sex offenses) or for specific triggering
events (for example, offenses involving use of a firearm, against a minor, or in proximity
to a school). Since the 1980s, mandatory minimum sentences have become a central
feature of U.S. federal and state criminal justice systems, ballooning prison populations
and exacerbating racial disparities as a result (Tonry, 2013).
In light of this pattern, civil rights activists have called for urgent reforms to mandatory minimums. The Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) of 2010 aimed to reduce the racial gap in
federal mandatory minimum sentences for powder and crack cocaine offenses. However,
Bjerk (2017a) finds that the FSA did little to reverse patterns in excessive sentencing
for crack cocaine defendants, but rather sustained ex ante downward sentencing trends.
Moreover, we know very little about the efficacy of these reforms at the state level,
and whether they help mitigate racial-ethnic disparities in sentencing outcomes. This
study aims to address this conspicuous gap in the literature by evaluating the impact of
state-level mandatory minimum reforms on drug sentences and consequent racial-ethnic
disparities.
To do this, we exploit administrative data from the National Corrections Reporting
Program (NCRP) (1997-2016), which provides prisoner-level data on offenses, demographics, admission and release dates, and judicially imposed sentences. Yet, it is impor2

tant to acknowledge the limitations of the NCRP data, with numerous states reporting
inconsistent administrative prison records (Neal and Rick, 2016; Pfaff, 2011). As such,
the study follows Neal and Rick (2016) to define a restricted analysis sample comprised
of the thirteen states1 that consistently report prison admissions data. Since state-level
mandatory minimums are predominantly applied to drug crimes, we also restrict our
analyses to prisoners convicted of drug offenses. Next, to establish causality, we use a
generalized difference-in-difference (DD) strategy to evaluate how exogenous variations
in state mandatory minimum reforms change the drug sentences of prisoners relative to
counterparts in states without any such reforms. In addition, we use a generalized tripledifference (DDD) strategy to evaluate how Black-White and Hispanic-White sentence
disparities change in response to these reforms.
Using generalized DD estimation, we find that in general, mandatory minimum reforms do not change sentence durations for drug offenses statistically significantly. However, these reforms appear to have a delayed effect (largely driven by the state of New
York), reducing drug sentences four or more years, ex post. In our heterogeneous analyses by race-ethnicity, we also observe a decline in drug sentences (p < 0.10) for Hispanic
defendants; however, we are unable to determine whether this decline occurs in response
to changes in judicial discretion (Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2012) or shifts in prosecutorial behavior (Didwania, 2020). Further research investigating changes in judicial
and prosecutorial behaviors in response to state-level mandatory minimum reforms is
imperative.
Our DDD estimates do not provide robust evidence that mandatory minimum sentence reforms reduce sentencing disparities between minorities and Whites. Although
state-level mandatory minimum reforms appear to reduce the sentences of Hispanic pris1

These states are California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, North Dakota, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. We discuss the rational for selecting
these states in more detail in Section 4.
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oners relative to their White counterparts, nonparallel pre-reform trends render this finding biased.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional
details of reforms to state mandatory minimum laws. Section 3 provides an overview of
the existing literature. Section 4 introduces the data and presents summary statistics.
Section 5 provides an overview of the empirical strategies used in the analysis. Section 6
presents the main findings and sensitivity checks. Section 8 summarizes our conclusions.

2

Institutional Background
Mandatory minimum sentencing laws are statutes that require judges to sentence

defendants to minimum prison terms for certain crimes. These laws constrain sentencing
or release decisions for various offenses (for example, drug-related offenses) or triggering
events (for example, offenses involving use of a firearm). At the federal level, mandatory
minimums were enacted primarily for drug crimes and were chiefly based on some weight
threshold of the drug. For instance, the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act imposed a minimum
five-year sentence for drug offenses involving 5 grams of crack, 500 grams of cocaine, or
1 kilogram of heroin (21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), P.L. 99-570).
At the state level, mandatory minimums are used as a blunt tool for crime deterrence.
They broadly target certain crimes (for example, drug-related crimes), or certain drug
quantity thresholds (for example, crack or cocaine), or are triggered by a particular benchmark (for example, school zones or repeat reoffenses). Albeit race-neutral, mandatory
minimums failed to account for the fact that certain offenses are highly correlated with
race and ethnicity, leading to disparate impact (Schlesinger, 2011; Bonilla-Silva, 2006).
As such, mandatory minimums not only helped generate the highest incarceration rate
in the world, but also stark racial-ethnic disparities in the prison population.

4

Under mandatory minimum laws, if a prosecutor presents charges and a defendant
is found guilty, judges must impose the mandatory minimum sentence even when there
are mitigating factors at work. Prosecutors can also leverage mandatory minimums to
coerce plea bargains from defendants. Plea bargains essentially strong-arm defendants
into pleading guilty to obtain a more favorable sentence; alternatively, they could go to
trial and face the credible threat of a mandatory minimum sentence (Bjerk, 2005; Fellner,
2014; Oppel Jr, 2011). Plea bargains may appear to produce better sentencing outcomes
for defendants, but they are not costless. The prosecutorial power of the plea bargain
endangers the defendants’ right to have their day in court and the opportunity to be
acquitted. Further, the prosecutorial discretion that mandatory minimums afford can exacerbate racial-ethnic disparities in sentencing, with more favorable deals going to White
defendants compared to their minority counterparts, who disproportionately comprise the
correctional population (Starr and Rehavi, 2013; Ulmer et al., 2007). Therefore, mandatory minimums tend to worsen sentencing disparities inside and outside the courtroom,
prompting widespread activism for reform.
At the federal level, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 directly targeted the sentencing
gap between crack and powder cocaine offenses. However, reforms to mandatory minimum sentencing at the state level are diverse in their form and impact. There are four
main types of mandatory minimum reforms: repeal or revision of mandatory minimums,
expansion of judicial discretion, “second look” judicial review, and repeal or revision of
automatic sentence enhancements (Families Against Mandatory Minimums, 2019).
The primary focus of our study is mandatory minimum sentence repeals and revisions
given that judicial discretion under “safety valves”, second look, and automatic sentence
enhancements is all predicated on conditions we cannot observe in our data.2 Repeals and
2

“Safety valves” involve provisions that keep a mandatory minimum penalty in place, but allow
judges to sentence defendants below that minimum if certain factors apply. These policies do not repeal
or eliminate mandatory minimum sentences but rather allow courts to give shorter, more appropriate
prison sentences to individuals who pose less of a public safety threat. Second look sentencing is a process
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revisions represent full or partial modifications to existing mandatory minimum sentence
laws, typically issued for drug offenses. For instance, Arkansas, revised their mandatory
minimum laws by narrowing the crimes to which these laws apply. In 2012, Missouri simply lowered the mandatory minimum sentence for some crack cocaine trafficking offenses.
Therefore, mandatory minimum reforms give judges more discretion over what sentences
to hand down, while mitigating the prosecutors’ leverage to negotiate potentially biased
sentences or wrongful convictions.
Because repeals or revisions to state mandatory minimum laws primarily target drug
offenses, our analyses evaluate how such drug-, state-, and year-specific reforms impact judicially imposed sentences, ex post.3 Figure OA1 shows that by 2015, nineteen states had
either repealed or revised mandatory minimum guidelines for drug offenses. We report
these states along with the effective date of these laws in Appendix Table A1. Because
the study focuses on reforms that either revise or fully repeal mandatory minimums, the
results represent a lower bound of the effect of eliminating mandatory minimums altogether. One important caveat is that although we know the reforms partially or fully
modify mandatory minimum sentences, we cannot always observe precisely how judges
execute these modifications. Therefore, the results are best characterized as intent-totreat effects.

by which courts review, or take another “look” at a lengthy sentence (after a significant portion of the
sentence has been served), and authorizes a judge to modify the sentence. Some states go a step further,
by repealing or revising the automatic sentence enhancements that trigger longer sentences if certain
statutory conditions or thresholds are met, such as speeding in a construction zone, selling drugs in a
school zone, committing a crime in the presence of a minor, using a handgun in the commission of a
crime, or having a certain number of previous criminal convictions.
3
In our sensitivity checks, we control for the other three types of mandatory minimum reforms: safety
valves, sentence enhancements, and second look; the results are consistent with the general findings.
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Literature Review
There are three main strands of the growing literature on mandatory minimum sen-

tences. The first strand exploits state-level crime data to examine changes to sentencing
guidelines and policies on criminal justice outcomes. Dominguez-Rivera et al. (2019)
and Bartos and Kubrin (2018) explore the effect of California’s Proposition 47 (Prop
47), which reduced drug possession offenses and certain lower-level property offenses to
misdemeanors. While these studies find a decrease in jail and state-prison populations
and in property- and drug-crime arrests, they find little to no evidence that Prop 47
affects violent-, property-, or drug-crime rates.4 Helland and Tabarrok (2007) find that
California’s three-strikes laws reduce felony arrest rates by 17 to 20 percent among individuals who already have two strikes. On the other hand, Marvell and Moody (2001) find
that three-strikes laws increase homicides, with little to no evidence of other crime reduction. Moreover, Abrams (2012) finds that sentence enhancements, rather than mandatory
minimums, have a deterrent effect on armed robberies.
The second strand of the literature examines racial disparities in the prosecutorial
application of mandatory minimum sentences and judicial adherence to sentencing guidelines at the federal level. Rehavi and Starr (2014) find that mandatory minimums explain
a significant portion of the Black-White sentencing gap. In addition, Yang (2015) and
Starr and Rehavi (2013) show that mandatory minimums were more likely to be used
against Black defendants after the Booker decision.5 Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough promoted
additional departures from Booker, which ultimately did not benefit Black defendants
(Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2012). Insofar as sentences for White and Hispanic defendants declined post-Rita, sentences for Black defendants flatlined, except under binding
4

In addition, Lofstrom et al. (2020) argue that Prop 47 lowered arrests, bookings, and pretrial
detention quickly and substantially.
5
This refers to the United States v. Booker majority decision that made federal sentencing guidelines
advisory rather than mandatory.
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mandatory minimum constraints. Multiple reports from the U.S. Sentencing Commission also found that racial disparities increased after Booker (USSC, 2006, 2011, 2010),
though the racial gap appears to narrow in more recent years (USSC, 2017).6
More recently, Tuttle (2019) uses irregular bunching around drug thresholds to assess
the extent to which the FSA helped change racial-ethnic disparities in crack-cocaine
sentences, and highlights the key roles of prosecutorial discretion and racial discrimination
in explaining this bunching.7 He finds that Black and Hispanic defendants tend to cluster
above the mandatory minimum threshold that triggers a ten-year mandatory minimum,
while White defendants disproportionately appear below the threshold. Sorensen et al.
(2014) find that under federal mandatory minimum guidelines, judicial preferences tend
to disadvantage Black males relative to White counterparts. In addition, defendants
that are high school graduates or female – initially subject to harsher sentences under
these guidelines – receive more lenient sentences ex post, although the latter reduction
is attributed to changes in the methodology of sentence application rather than judge’s
leniency (Nutting, 2013).
The third (and most scant) strand of the literature evaluates how reforms to mandatory minimum policies change sentencing patterns and whether these changes differentially impact minority defendants. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 aimed to reduce the
racial-ethnic gap in federal mandatory minimum sentences for powder and crack cocaine
offenses. In two related papers, Bjerk (2017a,b) evaluate the impact of the FSA on federal
sentencing, by examining the implementation of mandatory minimums and their differential impact on sentencing for individuals convicted of federal crack and powder cocaine
crimes. Bjerk (2017a) concludes the FSA was not primarily responsible for the decline
6

Racial disparities in federal sentencing has also been documented in multiple reports from various
federal agencies. For example, USSC (2018) reports that penalty enhancement for federal drug trafficking
with a prior felony drug conviction is disproportionally used against Blacks.
7
At the state level, Sloan (2019) finds prosecutors do not generally exhibit racial bias, except against
individuals charged with property offenses.
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in sentences for crack cocaine defendants, but continued the existing downward trend in
sentences. Bjerk (2017b) shows that while eligibility for mandatory minimum sentences
raises sentences on average, this increase is not uniform across individuals. For example, first-time drug defendants are likely to avoid prosecution because of “safety valve”
provisions. Additionally, Didwania (2020) finds that an August 2013 memo – disseminated by then attorney general Eric Holder advising federal prosecutors to end the use
of mandatory minimums for low-level non-violent offenses – modestly reduced sentence
length for those eligible for mandatory minimums, but did not reduce the corresponding
racial-ethnic disparities.
We complement the first strand of the literature by examining whether reforms to
state mandatory minimum policies impact criminal sentencing, as well as the second
strand, by evaluating the extent to which racial-ethnic sentencing disparities change in
response to these reforms. However, our study makes the most significant contribution
to the third strand, by complementing this literature in three ways. First, we directly
examine racial-ethnic disparities in sentencing after mandatory minimum reforms. This
lies in contrast to Bjerk (2017a,b), which only examine sentencing disparities between
crack and powder cocaine defendants. Second, we add to this literature by evaluating
the impact of state-level mandatory minimum reforms on judicially imposed sentences for
drug offenses. We focus on states that either repeal or revise their mandatory minimum
sentences and how this in turn affects the sentencing outcomes of individuals charged with
drug offenses. Understanding the effect of these reforms at the state-level is of particular
policy interest, given that majority of people incarcerated for drug offenses are charged
at the state level.8

8

In 2019, Carson (2020) estimated that roughly 73,200 individuals were incarcerated for a drug crime
at the federal level compared to 176,300 at the state level.

9

4

Data
We use data on prison admissions from the National Corrections Reporting Program

(NCRP) (1997-2016) compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The NCRP is a
prisoner-level data set in which participating states voluntarily submit data on prisoners
entering and leaving the custody of state authorities. Over the sample period, fortyfour states provided prisoner-level data on admissions to prison at some point. For
each prison spell, we observe the admission and release date for each prisoner along
with the corresponding judicially imposed sentence. Additionally, the NCRP contains
rich information on prisoners’ demographic characteristics, such as age, race, Hispanic
ethnicity, highest grade completed, gender, whether the individual has previously been
convicted of and incarcerated for a felony, and the type of entry (for example, new
conviction or probation/parole revocation). We also observe up to three crimes for which
the prisoner was convicted and the total sentence length. We restrict our analysis to
individuals who have been convicted of a drug-related offense for at least one of the
three crimes we observe. Since the study evaluates the effect of mandatory minimums
on sentencing, we consider prisoners who have either been released from prison or are
currently incarcerated.
Figure A1 shows the average sentence length of prisoners in the NCRP data.9 The
average sentence is 62 months, or approximately five years. For Blacks, the average
sentence is about 68.5 months, whereas White and Hispanic prisoners have similar average
sentences of 59.4 and 54.5 months, respectively. This suggests that the average BlackWhite sentence gap is about nine months, while the Hispanic-White sentence gap is
significantly lower at about five months.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all the control variables in our empirical
9

We topcoded sentences at 720 months or 60 years. We tested a variety of sentence topcodes or
upper bounds, and find that the results are qualitatively similar to the main findings. Our results are
also robust to winsorizing the outcome at the 99th percentile.

10

analysis using the full NCRP sample of states.10 Unsurprisingly, the analysis sample is
largely comprised of minority males with low education. Almost half of the prisoners are
Black and about 17 percent are Hispanic. Thirty percent of prisoners are high school
dropouts, and the average age at prison admission is 34.5 years old. Roughly 27 percent
of prisoners had felony convictions prior to their current incarceration episode, and close
to 25.7 percent of prisoners were incarcerated for violating parole or probation.11
Prisoner characteristics and offenses vary significantly by race and ethnicity. Twentyfour percent of Black prisoners have high school diplomas, and a higher percentage of
Blacks (roughly 30.6 percent) had felony convictions prior to the current sentence. In
addition, a larger percentage of Blacks (27 percent) had their probation or parole revoked.
Hispanic prisoners have the youngest age of admission, at 33.6 years old and the lowest
incidence of probation or parole revocation, at 22 percent. About 4 percent of White
and 3 percent of Black prisoners have more than a high school diploma compared to 1.6
percent of Hispanic prisoners.

12

White prisoners are the oldest at the age of admission,

at nearly 35.3 years old.
However, the NCRP has a key limitation in that it relies on potentially inconsistent
voluntary state reporting. Several studies using older versions of the NCRP data have
identified issues with data reliability and have used a subset of states to ensure consistency
(Neal and Rick, 2016; Pfaff, 2011). For the purposes of this study, we follow Neal and Rick
(2016) to identify states that provide consistent NCRP reports. Neal and Rick (2016) use
an extract of the NCRP that better matches the time frame of our sample compared to
Pfaff (2011), and performs both an external and internal vetting of the prison admissions
10

We present the summary statistics for the thirteen-state consistent sample in Table A2. Note
that the time-invariant personal and prison-spell characteristics in the NCRP have missing data. Thus,
we report the fraction of prisoners with missing race, ethnicity, and educational level in our summary
statistics.
11
Although the sample seems to consist of fewer recidivists, this is not completely surprising given
that prior felony incarceration data are missing for some states (Yang, 2017).
12
These statistics should be interpreted with caution given that a large percentage of the sample has
missing values in educational level.
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data, imperative for accurately measuring our outcome of interest.
Therefore, in addition to using the full NCRP sample, we also restrict our analyses
to the thirteen states — California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, North Dakota,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin — that
Neal and Rick (2016) show consistently report prison inflows and outflows from 1983
through 2009.13 In particular, we restrict our sample to states that pass the first and
third consistency tests in Neal and Rick (2016),14 which concludes that for these states,
the NCRP records on admissions and releases are internally consistent (i.e., for a given
year, the total number of prisoners released with recorded admission dates do not exceed
the number of prisoners recorded in the admissions files) and externally consistent (i.e.,
there are no large deviations in terms of admissions and releases of prisoners between the
NCRP data and the National Prisoner Statistics data). Table A2 presents the summary
statistics for this consistent sample. In general, they are statistically similar to those
presented in Table 1.

5

Empirical Strategy

5.1

Difference-in-Difference Estimation (DD)

To estimate the effect of mandatory minimum reforms on judicially imposed sentencing, we exploit variation in the staggered timing of state sentencing laws that repeal or
revise mandatory minimums. We use the effective dates of these sentencing reforms as
exogenous shocks to sentence length in a difference-in-difference framework. Exploiting
the panel nature of our data and the fact that states reform their sentencing practices at
different times, we set our baseline specification as follows:
13

Of these states, Michigan, New York, and South Carolina revised or repealed their MMLs.
We also want to point out that neither Pfaff (2011) nor Neal and Rick (2016) vet the NCRP data
for specific years. As such, it is possible that for specific years, some of the states excluded from the
consistent sample might pass internal and external consistency tests.
14
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Sentenceist = α + βM M Lst + γXit + δt + ηs + ist

(1)

where Sentenceist is total sentence length, measured in months, of prisoner i, imprisoned
for any drug offense in state s and admitted in year-month t. M M Lst is the DD indicator
for whether state s has reformed (repealed or revised) its mandatory minimum sentencing
laws by the year-month t in which the individual was admitted.
Xit is a vector of characteristics about the individual imprisoned. These characteristics
are both time-invariant (race/ethnicity, gender, highest grade completed at entry) and
specific to the particular prison spell (age at admission and prior-felony incarceration).
We also include indicators for missing data on each of these time-invariant and prison-spell
characteristics. δt and ηs are prison-admission year and state fixed effects, respectively.
ist is serially-correlated, and thus we cluster standard errors at the state level.
Our identification of the impact of state sentencing reforms for incarcerated individuals
compares observably similar individuals admitted to prison in the same state, who happen
to be sentenced either under the old “get tough” sentencing policies or under the repealed
or revised mandatory minimums. The coefficient of interest, β, is identified using random
variation in the month of admission, whether that admission occurred before or after the
passage of the mandatory minimum sentencing reforms, and how an individual’s sentence
compares with the sentences of other prisoners with similar characteristics. We show
pre-trends in coefficient plots as evidence that our controls are adequately absorbing
pre-existing trends. We explain this strategy in the following subsection.

5.2

Event-Study Design

We extend our difference-in-difference framework to an event study by including leads
and lags of treatment as regressors. The event-study specification can be written as

13

follows:15

Sentenceist = α +

X

βL M M LLst + γXit + δt + ηs + ist

(2)

L∈K

where K = {−4, −3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, with −4 denoting four or more years before
and 4 denoting four or more years after the state mandatory minimum sentencing reform
took effect.16 Similar to the variable of interest in the difference-in-difference framework,
our variable of interest, Sentenceiost , is sentence length, measured in months; Xit is a
vector of characteristics about the individual imprisoned; δt are year fixed effects; and ηs
are state fixed effects.
The set of M M LLst dummies represents the year, L, relative to the enactment of the
mandatory minimum sentencing reform. (L = 0 denotes the year of implementation of
the mandatory minimum sentencing reform and is the excluded category.) For example,
M M L1st is an indicator that equals to 1 if prisoner i is admitted one year after the
reform and 0 otherwise. Each of the βL coefficients is measured relative to the omitted
category – the year of implementation. The validity of this research design relies on the
assumption that the outcome in treatment and comparison states would have behaved
similarly in post-reform years without mandatory minimum sentencing reforms. Finding
βL coefficients in the pre-reform years that are not statistically different from the excluded
category (that is, parallel trends), indicates that other policies or events do not conflate
post-year impact estimates. As we show in Section 6, the parallel pre-trends suggest that
the states that did not reform their mandatory minimum sentencing practices are a valid
comparison group for this quasi-experimental exercise.

15

See Jacobson et al. (1993) for more detail on the event-study specification.
We experimented with different leads and lags, but results are robust to the event-window definition.
Also, note that we bin up the event dummies at the endpoints of the event window (that is, K = −4
and K = 4), and thus the dummy M M L−4
st accounts for all reforms of mandatory minimums occurring
four or more years, ex ante.
16

14

5.3

Triple-Difference Estimation (DDD)

The DD analysis allows us to estimate intent-to-treat effects of repealing or revising
states’ mandatory minimum laws on sentencing. Next, we expand on this analysis to
explore whether these effects are more pronounced among Black and Hispanic prisoners
relative to White counterparts. To evaluate whether mandatory minimum reforms change
Black and Hispanic sentences statistically significantly relative to Whites, we adopt the
following triple-difference (DDD) model:

Sentenceist =α + δM M L ∗ BHi + β1 M M Lst + β2 BHi + β3 BHist ∗ λs
(3)
+ β5 γt ∗ BHit + β6 Xit + γt + λs + ist
where BHi is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the prisoner is Black(Hispanic) and
0 if the prisoner is White. As in equation 1, M M Lst is the DD indicator for whether
state s has reformed (repealed or revised) its mandatory minimum sentencing laws for
the year-month t in which the individual was admitted. The coefficient of interest on the
interaction M M L ∗ BHi , δ1 , measures the net impact of mandatory minimum reforms
on the sentences of Black(Hispanic) prisoners relative to White prisoners, ex post. As
with the event-study DD design, we extend this triple-difference model into an eventstudy specification.

17

Identification of causal effects in the event-study DDD design also

requires common trends before treatment.

17

More specifically, the corresponding event-study equation can be written as follows:
X
Sentenceist =α +
δ L M M LL
st ∗ BHi + β1 M M Lst + β2 BHi + β3 BHist ∗ λs
(4)

L∈K

+ β4 γt ∗ BHit + β5 Xit + γt + λs + ist
where K = {−4, −3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4} with −4 denoting four or more years before and 4 denoting four
or more years after the state mandatory minimum sentencing reform.

15

6

Results
Table 2 presents general and event-study DD impact estimates from equations 1 and 2

using the full and restricted NCRP samples, respectively. Columns (1) and (3) show that
mandatory minimum reforms reduce sentences by about 11 and 25 months in general,
although these estimates are not statistically different from zero. To evaluate the dynamic
effects of these reforms and test the parallel-trend assumption, Columns (2) and (4)
present the event-study impact estimates from equation 2. Pre-reform estimates are
positive, but are not statistically different from zero, confirming that outcome trends of
treatment and comparison groups are parallel. Figure 1 illustrates these event-study DD
estimates along with their confidence intervals. While we use the graphical representation
of the event-study specifications to illustrate flat pre-trends, we also observe that rather
than dissipating, the treatment effect grows over time to reduce sentence length by up
to 25 months (p < 0.10) in the full sample and 36 months in the consistent sample
(p < 0.05), ex post.18
We also explore treatment effect heterogeneity by race and ethnicity in Figure 2. We
find evidence that lower drug sentences have a downward trend, ex post; however, the
impact is only statistically significant for Hispanic defendants. Figure 2 depicts parallel
pre-reform trends for Hispanics, boosting our confidence in these heterogeneous effects.
Given that the literature has already established that minorities are more likely to
be affected by mandatory minimums (Rehavi and Starr, 2014; Yang, 2015; Starr and
18

We also want to note that our generalized difference-in-difference model uses staggered adoption of
mandatory minimum reforms. Given that our results suggest that the impact of mandatory minimum
reforms vary over time, we follow (De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille, 2020) to test for the presence
of negative weights in our estimation. We find no negative weights, but instead all positive weights.
De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020)’s explanation for the lack of negative weights is: the random
assignment of treated units to each group, treatment effects do not differ statistically significantly between
periods with many versus few treated groups, and between groups are treated for many versus few periods.
De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020) also note that “[o]verall, negative weights are much more
prevalent in the “more early adopters” than in the later adopters case.” In our study, there are very
few early adopters, which suggests that early treatment effects might not differ substantially from later
treatment effects.
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Rehavi, 2013), it is highly relevant to determine how the Black-White and HispanicWhite sentence disparities change in response to these reforms. The study measures the
impact of mandatory minimum reforms on racial-ethnic disparities in sentencing using
DDD estimation. These findings are presented in equation 3 in Table 3. For example,
Table 3 Columns (3) and (7) show that Hispanic prisoners receive sentences more than
30 months (p < 0.05) lower than White counterparts, ex post. On the other hand, DDD
analyses show no statistically significant changes in the Black-White sentence disparity
for drug offenses in response to the reforms.19
However, we must underscore that the validity of these DDD results hinges on parallel
pre-reform outcome trends. As such, we present event-study DDD estimates for the
Black-White and Hispanic-White sentence disparities in Table 3 and in Figures 3 and
4. The findings reveal that the identifying assumption of parallel trends is violated in
both samples, with pre-reform indicators that are statistically significant. This finding
suggests that while mandatory minimum reforms appear to lower drug sentences for
Hispanic prisoners relative to their White counterparts, the result is likely to be biased.
Therefore, these DDD results indicate that although sentencing disparities grew under
mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines, there is no evidence that these disparites
diminish when such guidelines are relaxed (Mustard, 2001; Fischman and Schanzenbach,
2012).
One limitation of the thirteen-state consistent sample is that only three states (Michigan, New York, and South Carolina) are treated. Although the majority of these states
repealed (rather than revised) their mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines, the corresponding impact estimates are not statistically different from the general estimates.
Additionally, the few-treated-states problem produces incorrect standard errors, which
19

To gain more efficiency, we also pool all observations in the full sample and re-estimate the DDD
model as one regression equation. The results from the pooled DDD model – presented in Online
Appendix Table OA1 – are qualitatively similar to the non-pooled DDD estimates in Table 3.
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require wild-cluster-bootstrapped standard errors for unbiased inference (Cameron et al.,
2008). Using one thousand wild-cluster-bootstrap iterations, the significance levels of the
DD and DDD impact estimates are statistically similar to the main findings.

7

Sensitivity Checks
We run numerous checks to test the sensitivity of our estimates. First, we explore the

sensitivity of our estimates to the inclusion of different time trends.20 For DD and DDD
models, Online Appendix Table OA2 shows that the inclusion of state-specific linear and
quadratic time trends do not change the full or consistent sample estimates statistically
significantly. Additionally, standard errors remain quite stable in each specification. We
also estimate the robustness of results to the inclusion of state-by-admission-year fixed
effects. We present these estimates in Online Appendix Table OA3. The general DD
results are smaller in magnitude, but remain statistically equivalent to zero. However,
the event-study analysis shows that state-level mandatory minimum reforms lower drug
sentences statistically significantly, four or more years, ex post. We also observe that
post-reform, the sentence gap between Blacks and Whites is exacerbated.
We also test the robustness of the findings to outliers and alternative functional form
assumptions. Online Appendix Tables OA4 and OA5 indicate the results remain statistically similar to the main findings when we winsorize (at the 99th percentile) and
log-transform sentence length, respectively. Moreover, prior felony incarceration has information missing for some states; however, excluding this control variable does not
change our findings statistically significantly (Neal and Rick, 2016) (see Online Appendix
Table OA6).
It is important to note that mandatory minimum reforms – measured as repeals or
revisions to mandatory minimums – may be a part of sweeping overhauls to state-level
20

Time is defined as prison admission year.
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sentencing guidelines. To test this possibility, we construct a binary indicator equal to 1
if a state has passed any other of the three types of mandatory minimum reforms (that
is, judicial discretion, sentence enhancements, or second look). We re-estimate equations
1 and 3 controlling for this indicator and present the results in Panels A and B of Online
Appendix Table OA7. The results remain statistically similar to the main findings.
We also examine whether the general findings are driven by specific states, by excluding each state from the full and consistent sample analyses in succession. Online Appendix
Figure OA2 shows that when Indiana and Michigan are excluded from the analyses, the
general estimate falls to just below zero; meanwhile, excluding Missouri and New York
raises the general estimate to just above zero. However, standard errors remain large
for these estimates, suggesting that despite the deviation from zero, the general finding
that mandatory minimum reforms do not statistically significantly change drug sentences
holds. We also exploit this “leave-one-out’ method for the DDD analyses used to evaluate
Black-White and Hispanic-White sentencing disparities, respectively. Online Appendix
Figures OA3 and OA4 follow a similar pattern to Online Appendix Figure OA2, where a
few states deviate from the general zero estimate, but retain large standard errors.
Still, we must acknowledge that in all of these figures, New York appears to have the
strongest influence on the findings – the estimates all shift statistically significantly when
it is excluded from the analysis samples.21 The results in Online Appendix Table OA8
Columns (1)-(2) suggest that the decline in sentences, as a result of mandatory minimums
reforms, is likely driven by the state of New York because the point estimate is no longer
statistically significant, four or more years, ex post. Yet, this result is not surprising.
In 2004, the state of New York passed a major reform that overhauled the criminal
justice system, including mandatory minimum sentences. Subsequently, the 2009 Drug
21

Note that when we exclude Missouri – another state that our estimates are highly sensitive to –
we find statistically significant effects; however, Missouri does not consistently report data to the NCRP
and likely accounts for the biased results (see Columns (3)-(4) in Online Appendix Table OA8).
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Law Reform Act eliminated all mandatory minimum sentences and expanded judicial
discretion over drug treatment and rehabilitation as an alternative to incarceration.22 As
such, this may explain why we observe the largest decrease four or more years after the
first mandatory minimum reform in 2004.
Because of the guidelines of mandatory minimum reforms, people who are charged
with a drug offense, ex ante, may not receive the same charge, ex post. As such, our evaluation of drug sentences as the outcome of interest may understate the role of mandatory
minimum reforms. To test this possibility, we evaluate the number and fraction of sentences by type of offense as outcome variables. Online Appendix Figure OA5 shows that
changes in the number of sentences for violent, property, drug trafficking, drug possession, and any drug offense in the years preceding and proceeding mandatory minimum
reforms are statistically similar to zero. Meanwhile, the number of sentences for other
offenses, broadly defined, increases statistically significantly over time. When we evaluate
the composition of crimes – as measured by the fraction of total sentences for each offense
– Online Appendix Figure OA6 shows that the estimates pre- and post- reform are in
general statistically equivalent to zero, except four or more years, ex post. Therefore,
along with the role of New York in the analysis samples, the composition of crimes may
help explain why drug sentences decline four or more years after mandatory minimum
reforms. However, we cannot ignore that for this sensitivity check, the estimates on four
or more years, ex post, are small in magnitude; as such, crime composition is unlikely to
fully explain the decline in drug sentences four or more years after mandatory minimum
reforms took effect.

22

In fact, we observe a relatively large decrease in drug-crime-related prison admissions in New York
after this reform (see Online Appendix Table OA9).
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8

Conclusions
The existing literature explores the effect of mandatory minimum sentencing guide-

lines on criminal justice outcomes. However, most of this literature evaluates the impact
of changes in federal sentencing guidelines and practices (Fischman and Schanzenbach,
2012; Rehavi and Starr, 2014; Yang, 2015; Starr and Rehavi, 2013; Didwania, 2020) or examine the effect of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 on federal sentencing patterns (Bjerk,
2017a,b; Tuttle, 2019). This study, on the other hand, investigates the effect of mandatory minimum reforms at the state level, where more than 60 percent of US prisoners
convicted of a drug offense are housed (Carson, 2020).
Specifically, our study evaluates whether repealing or revising state-level mandatory
minimums can reduce judicially imposed sentences and concomitant racial-ethnic disparities. We use prisoner-level data from the National Corrections Reporting Program (1997
- 2016) along with generalized difference-in-difference and triple-difference estimation to
identify the impact of these reforms. We uncover that in general, state reforms to mandatory minimums do not change overall drug sentences statistically significantly. However,
these reforms reduce drug sentences four or more years after the state mandatory minimum reform took effect (although this impact is largely driven by New York). We also
observe that drug sentence declines are most pronounced for Hispanic defendants.
Our study acknowledges that the NCRP does not consistently report prison admissions data for all states. As such, we restrict the analysis sample to the thirteen states that
have been identified by Neal and Rick (2016) to provide internally and externally consistent reporting of these data. Using this restricted analysis sample, the general finding
holds: state-level mandatory minimum reforms do not lower drug sentences statistically
significantly.
We also explore whether the disparate impact of early race-neutral mandatory minimum policies (Schlesinger, 2011; Bonilla-Silva, 2006) is ameliorated by subsequent manda21

tory minimum revisions or repeals. To do this, we use DDD estimation to evaluate changes
in Black-White and Hispanic-White disparities in drug sentencing, ex post. We do not
find statistically significant evidence that revisions or repeals of mandatory minimum
laws decrease sentencing disparities. This is consistent with the prior literature that
finds little (Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2012) to modest reductions (Didwania, 2020)
in racial disparities in sentencing in response to sentencing reforms.
Our findings may be driven by changes in judicial treatment of minority defendants
(Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2012), or changes in prosecutorial behavior (Didwania,
2020). While this goes beyond the scope of our paper, future research dedicated to
disentangling these mechanisms is exceedingly important.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Event-Study DD Estimates

Notes: This figure plots event-study estimates (βL , L = {−4, −3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) and corresponding 95 percent confidence bands of equation 2. The full sample consist of all states reporting
to NCRP (1997-2016) while the consistent sample is restricted to the thirteen states that consistently reported data, as identified by Neal and Rick (2016): California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Michigan, North Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin. The dependent variable is individual sentence length, measured in months. The omitted
dummy is year of implementation, so the coefficient β0 is set to zero. We control for individual
demographic characteristics (race, ethnicity, gender, age, age squared, highest grade completed,
prior felony incarceration) and reason for prison admission. We also include indicators for missing
data for each of these control variables. State and admission year fixed effects are included in all
specifications.
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Figure 2: Event-Study DD Estimates by Race-Ethnicity

Notes: This figure plots event-study estimates (δL , L = {−4, −3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) and corresponding 90 and 95 percent confidence bands. These estimates are computed separately subsamples
of NCRP based on race or ethnicity. The full sample consist of all states reporting to NCRP (19972016) while the consistent sample is restricted to the thirteen states that consistently reported data,
as identified by Neal and Rick (2016): California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, North
Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. The dependent variable is individual sentence length, measured in months. The omitted dummy is year of
implementation, so the coefficient δ0 is set to zero. We control for individual demographic characteristics (race, ethnicity, gender, age, age squared, highest grade completed, prior felony incarceration)
and reason for prison admission. We also include indicators for missing data for each of these control
variables. State and admission-year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Data are from
the National Corrections Reporting Program (1997-2016).
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Figure 3: Event-Study DDD Estimates of the Black-White Sentence Gap

Notes: This figure plots event-study estimates (δL , L = {−4, −3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) and corresponding 95 percent confidence bands of equation 4. The estimation sample consist of all states
reporting to NCRP (1997-2016). The dependent variable is individual sentence length, measured
in months. The omitted dummy is year of implementation, so the coefficient δ0 is set to zero. We
control for individual demographic characteristics (race, ethnicity, gender, age, age squared, highest
grade completed, prior felony incarceration) and reason for prison admission. We also include indicators for missing data for each of these control variables. State and admission year fixed effects are
included in all specifications.
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Figure 4: Event-Study DDD Estimates of the Hispanic-White Sentence Gap

Notes: This figure plots event-study estimates (δL , L = {−4, −3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) and corresponding 95 percent confidence bands of equation 4. The full sample consist of all states reporting
to NCRP (1997-2016) while the consistent sample is restricted to the thirteen states that consistently reported data, as identified by Neal and Rick (2016): California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Michigan, North Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin. The dependent variable is individual sentence length, measured in months. The omitted
dummy is year of implementation, so the coefficient δ0 is set to zero. We control for individual
demographic characteristics (race, ethnicity, gender, age, age squared, highest graded complete,
prior felony incarceration) and reason for prison admission. We also include indicators for missing
data for each of these control variables. State and admission year fixed effects are included in all
specifications.
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S.D.
91.977
0.499
0.484
0.363
0.345
0.345
0.378
0.480
0.389
0.458
0.431
0.181
0.064
0.492
9.811
0.443
0.492
0.389
0.256

White
Mean
S.D.
59.410
80.246
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.209
0.407
0.791
0.407
0.094
0.291
0.721
0.449
0.185
0.389
0.267
0.442
0.282
0.450
0.042
0.201
0.006
0.078
0.398
0.489
35.323
9.596
0.253
0.435
0.579
0.494
0.152
0.359
0.103
0.304
1,042,456

Black
Mean
S.D.
68.466
105.320
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.093
0.290
0.907
0.290
0.008
0.091
0.760
0.427
0.231
0.422
0.339
0.473
0.241
0.428
0.034
0.180
0.003
0.058
0.380
0.485
34.221
10.083
0.306
0.461
0.598
0.490
0.215
0.411
0.055
0.228
1,311,636

Hispanic
Mean
S.D.
54.494 82.553
0.023
0.149
0.203
0.402
0.774
0.418
0.094
0.291
0.906
0.291
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.304
0.460
0.179
0.383
0.014
0.118
0.002
0.042
0.500
0.500
33.619
9.430
0.181
0.385
0.607
0.488
0.187
0.390
0.035
0.185
480,109

Notes: This table contains summary statistics by race and ethnicity for all variables used in the analysis. We
restrict the sample to drug offenses. New court commitment, probation and parole revocation refer to the reason
for prison admittance. We report percent of the data with missing or other race, ethnicity, and educational
attainment. Data are from the National Corrections Reporting Program (1997-2016).

Sentence length (in months)
Black
White
Missing/other race
Female
Male
Hispanic
Not Hispanic
Missing/other ethnicity
Less than HS Degree
HS Degree
Some college
College Degree
Missing education
Age at prison admission
Prior Felony Incarceration
New court commitment
Parole revocation
Probation revocation
N

All
Mean
62.147
0.470
0.374
0.156
0.138
0.862
0.172
0.641
0.186
0.300
0.246
0.034
0.004
0.413
34.549
0.269
0.588
0.186
0.071
2,788,102

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Table 2: Main Results: Difference-in-Difference Estimates

MML
MML(-4)
MML(-3)
MML(-2)
MML(-1)
MML(1)
MML(2)
MML(3)
MML(4)
Mean Sentence
R-squared
N

Full Sample
General Event Study
(1)
(2)
-11.21
(11.58)
-4.064
(6.409)
0.544
(2.964)
1.038
(3.410)
3.341
(2.438)
-3.424
(5.542)
-8.683
(7.923)
-12.90
(8.083)
-25.43*
(12.97)
62.15
62.15
0.445
0.446
2788102
2788102

Consistent Sample
General Event Study
(3)
(4)
-24.69
(14.20)
1.762
(6.438)
0.537
(2.546)
-0.462
(3.996)
5.430**
(2.300)
-9.487
(5.979)
-16.03
(10.73)
-19.52
(11.79)
-35.69**
(15.80)
58.81
58.81
0.300
0.302
1392894
1392894

Notes: Column (1)-(2) are the full sample estimates while Columns
(3)-(4) represents estimates from the sample restricted to the thirteen states that consistently reported data, as identified by Neal
and Rick (2016): California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan,
North Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin. The dependent variable is individual
sentence length, measured in months. Column (1) and (3) report
the coefficient estimate on MML, a DD indicator that equals to 1
if a state has reformed (repealed or revised) its mandatory minimum sentencing laws for the year-month in which the individual
was admitted to prison. Columns (2) and (4) present the corresponding event-study estimates, with the number in brackets on
the MML variable indicating years prior or post mandatory minimum reforms. Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown
in parentheses (forty-three clusters). In all regressions, we control
for individual demographic characteristics (race, ethnicity, gender,
age, age squared, highest grade complete, prior felony incarceration) and reason for prison admission. We also include indicators
for missing data for each of these control variables. State and admission year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Data source: NCRP 1997-2016.
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Table 3: Main Results: Triple-Difference Estimates

MML
MML(-4)
MML(-3)
MML(-2)
MML(-1)
MML(1)
MML(2)
MML(3)
MML(4)
Mean Sentence
R-squared
N

Full Sample
Black
Hispanic
General
Event Study
General
Event Study
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1.557
-30.70**
(9.211)
(12.75)
-7.042*
0.695
(3.672)
(3.769)
-1.414
-0.326
(1.685)
(3.044)
-1.899
14.27***
(2.303)
(4.697)
0.899
10.46***
(1.500)
(2.980)
0.913
-11.17
(7.706)
(11.85)
-2.242
-24.33*
(7.878)
(12.18)
-5.706
-23.96*
(9.263)
(14.14)
-6.591
-36.08***
(11.65)
(12.22)
61.23
61.23
53.90
53.90
0.487
0.487
0.204
0.204
2204154
2204154
1322084
1322084

Consistent Sample
Black
Hispanic
General
Event Study
General
Event Study
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
15.38
-33.11**
(9.651)
(15.20)
-7.016
5.113*
(4.204)
(2.352)
-4.707**
-3.015
(1.632)
(2.211)
-7.327**
18.70***
(2.912)
(5.065)
-1.088
12.90***
(1.885)
(3.696)
15.32
1.882
(10.92)
(16.55)
10.24
-22.42
(10.76)
(16.88)
3.667
-27.31
(10.96)
(17.35)
2.588
-36.56*
(14.97)
(18.48)
58.87
58.87
53.28
53.28
0.319
0.319
0.216
0.217
1072415
1072415
655580
655580

Notes: Column (1)-(4) are the full sample estimates while Columns (5)-(8) represents estimates from the sample restricted
to the thirteen states that consistently reported data, as identified by Neal and Rick (2016): California, Colorado, Georgia,
Illinois, Michigan, North Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. The
odd columns report the coefficient estimate on MML, a DD indicator that equals to 1 if a state has reformed (repealed
or revised) its mandatory minimum sentencing laws for the year-month in which the individual was admitted to prison,
interacted with an indicator for whether the individual is Black or Hispanic, as indicted by the column headers. The even
columns present the corresponding event-study estimates, with the number in brackets the MML variable indication years
prior or post mandatory minimum reforms. The dependent variable is individual sentence length, measured in months.
Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses (forty-three clusters). In all regressions, we control
for individual demographic characteristics (race, ethnicity, gender, age, age squared, highest grade complete, prior felony
incarceration) and reason for prison admission. We also include indicators for missing data for each of these control variables.
State and admission year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Data source: NCRP 1997-2016.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Average Sentence Length by Race and Ethnicity

Notes: This figure plots full sample mean sentence length (in months) by race and ethnicity. Data
are from the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP).
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Table A1: State Criminal-Law Changes
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Date
(1)

Type of Drug Crimes
(2)

Consistent
(3)

3/22/2011

Drug Possession

7/11/2005
6/3/2003

Drug (Non-Violent)
All

7/1/2014
7/1/2012

Drug Trafficking
Drug Possession

1/1/2001

Drug Possession

6/29/2015

Drug(Non-Violent)

8/06/2010
1/1/2002

All
All

7/1/2014
8/28/2012

All
All

1/1/2004

All

9/30/2011
5/9/2012

All
All

1/1/2011
11/13/2009
6/2/2010

All
All
Drug Possession

Yes

10/1/2015

All

Yes

Repeal
(4)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Column (1) reports the exact implementation date for states that modified
or repealed mandatory minimum sentencing laws (MMLs). We were unable to
find the day and month of MML laws for Indiana, Michigan, New York, and
Pennsylvania, and thus we assume they were implemented on January 1. Column
(2) lists the crimes for which MMLs were modified or lifted. Column (3) lists
all states that consistently report data to NCRP (see Section 4 for more detail).
Column (4) indicates whether the MMLs were fully repealed.
Data sources: Sentencing Project, “The State of Sentencing: Developments in
Policy and Practice,” https://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/sentencing-policy/,
various years; Subramanian and Delaney (2013); Austin (2010); https://famm.org/;
and authors’ own research on state statutes and legislative histories.
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S.D.
80.254
0.500
0.465
0.396
0.324
0.324
0.409
0.471
0.323
0.426
0.371
0.159
0.061
0.496
9.663
0.422
0.499
0.442
0.166

White
Mean
S.D.
56.679 77.358
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.175
0.380
0.825
0.380
0.123
0.328
0.752
0.432
0.126
0.332
0.187
0.390
0.165
0.372
0.032
0.175
0.005
0.073
0.604
0.489
35.684
9.334
0.210
0.407
0.543
0.498
0.217
0.412
0.041
0.198
442,046

Black
Mean
S.D.
63.703 84.108
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.094
0.292
0.906
0.292
0.013
0.113
0.845
0.362
0.142
0.349
0.313
0.464
0.199
0.400
0.030
0.170
0.004
0.059
0.452
0.498
34.435
9.996
0.281
0.449
0.515
0.500
0.312
0.463
0.029
0.169
678,924

Hispanic
Mean
S.D.
55.768 88.377
0.030
0.170
0.183
0.387
0.787
0.409
0.086
0.281
0.914
0.281
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.184
0.387
0.096
0.294
0.007
0.084
0.001
0.037
0.710
0.454
34.006
9.282
0.127
0.333
0.535
0.499
0.244
0.430
0.007
0.082
296,075

Notes: This table contains summary statistics by race and ethnicity for all variables used in the analysis.
We restrict the sample to drug offenses. New court commitment, probation and parole revocation refer to
the reason for prison admittance. We report percent of the data with missing or other race, ethnicity, and
educational attainment. The sample is restricted to the thirteen states that consistently reported data, as
identified by Neal and Rick (2016): California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, North Dakota, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Data are from the National
Corrections Reporting Program (1997-2016).

Sentence length (in days)
Black
White
Missing/other race
Female
Male
Hispanic
Not Hispanic
Missing ethnicity
Less than HS Degree
HS Degree
Some College
College Degree
Missing education
Age at prison admission
Prior Felony Incarceration
New court commitment
Parole revocation
Probation revocation
N

All
Mean
58.807
0.487
0.317
0.195
0.119
0.881
0.213
0.669
0.119
0.238
0.165
0.026
0.004
0.565
34.782
0.231
0.523
0.266
0.028
1,392,894

Table A2: Summary Statistics: Consistent Sample

